论文标题
无许可的裁判比赛
Permissionless Refereed Tournaments
论文作者
论文摘要
可编程区块链中的可伸缩性问题对安全方法的需求很大，该方法将大部分计算移动到区块链之外。该问题的首选解决方案之一涉及链接计算机，这些计算机互动地证明了有限的区块链是它们的正确计算的正确结果。每链计算机都花在计算成本上花费线性，而区块链裁定仅花费对数努力的争议。但是，这项努力乘以竞争者的数量，涉及大量当事方不切实际且容易受到Sybil攻击的争议。在本文中，我们提出了一种实用的争议解决算法，通过该算法，一个诚实的竞争对手可以在计算成本上花费线性的同时赢得争议，但仅在不诚实的竞争者数量上对数。该算法是一种新颖，更强大的原始性，用于构建无许可的欺诈协议，该协议不依赖于要执行的复杂的经济激励措施。
Scalability problems in programmable blockchains have created a strong demand for secure methods that move the bulk of computation outside the blockchain. One of the preferred solutions to this problem involves off-chain computers that compete interactively to prove to the limited blockchain that theirs is the correct result of a given intensive computation. Each off-chain computer spends effort linear on the cost of the computation, while the blockchain adjudicates disputes spending only logarithmic effort. However, this effort is multiplied by the number of competitors, rendering disputes that involve a significant number of parties impractical and susceptible to Sybil attacks. In this paper, we propose a practical dispute resolution algorithm by which a single honest competitor can win disputes while spending effort linear on the cost of the computation, but only logarithmic on the number of dishonest competitors. This algorithm is a novel, stronger primitive for building permissionless fraud-proof protocols, which doesn't rely on complex economic incentives to be enforced.
