论文标题
理性地统计歧视：箭头符合菲尔普斯
Rationally Inattentive Statistical Discrimination: Arrow Meets Phelps
论文作者
论文摘要
当信息获取昂贵但灵活时，委托人可以合理地获取有利于一组的信息。前小组面临投资提高生产力的激励措施，而后者则不鼓励这种投资。反过来，校长忽略了群体之间的生产力差异，除非投资不足的群体以真正出色的结果使他感到惊讶。我们提供的条件下，尽管所有群体都与前相同，但主体最喜欢歧视性平衡。我们的结果为关于平权行动，隐性偏见以及职业种族隔离和刻板印象的讨论提供了信息。
When information acquisition is costly but flexible, a principal may rationally acquire information that favors one group over another. The former group faces incentives to invest in becoming productive, while the latter is discouraged from such investments. The principal, in turn, ignores the productivity difference between groups unless the underinvested group surprises him with a genuinely outstanding outcome. We give conditions under which the discriminatory equilibrium is most preferred by the principal, despite all groups being ex-ante identical. Our results inform the discussion of affirmative action, implicit bias, and occupational segregation and stereotypes.
