论文标题
价格和选择
Price & Choose
论文作者
论文摘要
我们描述了一种两阶段的机制，该机制充分实现了具有准线性实用程序的两机构环境中的有效结果集。该机制要求一个代理设定每个结果的价格，另一个代理商做出选择，支付相应的价格：价格\＆选择。我们将实施范围扩展到三个主要方向：任意数量的玩家，非Quasi线性实用程序以及对Max-Min行为的鲁棒性。最后，我们讨论了如何减少玩家之间的回报不平等，同时仍达到效率。
We describe a two-stage mechanism that fully implements the set of efficient outcomes in two-agent environments with quasi-linear utilities. The mechanism asks one agent to set prices for each outcome, and the other agent to make a choice, paying the corresponding price: Price \& Choose. We extend our implementation result in three main directions: an arbitrary number of players, non-quasi linear utilities, and robustness to max-min behavior. Finally, we discuss how to reduce the payoff inequality between players while still achieving efficiency.
