论文标题
兼职网络是一种防御机制:2015年中国金融危机期间公司如何聚集
Compacter networks as a defensive mechanism: How firms clustered during 2015 Financial Crisis in China
论文作者
论文摘要
股票市场对外部风险冲击的反应与跨股权网络结构密切相关。本文将A股证券市场中上市公司的公共信息作为研究股票收益率,市场绩效和网络拓扑之间关系之前和之后的主要样本。数据可视化和经验分析表明,股票的回报率与公司的传统商业能力与通过交叉销售带来的社交资本有关。对IV进行了几项异质性测试和内生性测试,以支持鲁棒性。冲击后,交叉共享网络的结构发生了动荡,甚至扭曲了市场价值的影响以及资产对收益率的持有。整个股权网络中的企业更加牢固地连接,以克服系统的外部风险。在此过程中,企业集群的数量大大减少。此外,新成立的跨股权关系的数量显示出爆发,这可以解释金融体系中稳定性的快速维护。当股票崩溃之前和之后(而不是发生时)形成稳定的聚类时,清除聚类的聚类系数仍然对库存的回报率显着积极影响。总而言之,紧凑型网络可能会阻止公司在金融危机前追求积极收入,但会保护公司免受冲击期间和之后遭受较高损失的损失。
The stock market's reaction to the external risk shock is closely related to the cross-shareholding network structure. This paper takes the public information of listed companies in the A-share securities market as the primary sample to study the relationship between the stock return rate, market performance, and network topology before and after China's stock market crash in 2015. Data visualization and empirical analysis demonstrate that the return rate of stocks is related to the company's traditional business ability and the social capital brought by cross-holding. Several heteroscedasticity tests and endogeneity tests with IV are conducted to support the robustness. The structure of the cross-shareholding network experienced upheaval after the shock, even distorting the effects of market value, and assets holding on the return rate. The enterprises in the entire shareholding network are connected more firmly to overcome systematic external risks. The number of enterprise clusters is significantly reduced during the process. Besides, the number of newly established cross-shareholding relationships shows an outbreak, which may explain the rapid maintenance of stability in the financial system. When stable clustering is formed before and after a stock crash (rather than when it occurs), the clustering coefficient of clear clustering still has an apparent positive influence on the return rate of stocks. To sum up, the compacted network may prevent the firms from pursuing aggressive earning before the financial crisis, but would protect firms from suffering relatively high losses during and after the shock.