论文标题
与探索的强大合同
Robust Contracts with Exploration
论文作者
论文摘要
我们研究两个周期的道德危害问题；有两个代理，其委托人未知的动作集。与每个代理商的主要合同依次签订，并试图最大化最差的折扣收益总和，而最坏的情况是在可能的行动集上。校长观察了第一代理商选择的行动，然后根据此知识为第二代理提供新合同，从而有机会在第一阶段进行探索。我们介绍并比较了动态最坏情况考虑的三个不同概念。在每个概念中，我们定义了更新和表征本金最佳收益保证的合适规则。我们发现，线性合同不仅在静态设置中，而且在具有探索的动态环境中也是最佳的。
We study a two-period moral hazard problem; there are two agents, with action sets that are unknown to the principal. The principal contracts with each agent sequentially, and seeks to maximize the worst-case discounted sum of payoffs, where the worst case is over the possible action sets. The principal observes the action chosen by the first agent, and then offers a new contract to the second agent based on this knowledge, thus having the opportunity to explore in the first period. We introduce and compare three different notions of dynamic worst-case considerations. Within each notion, we define a suitable rule of updating and characterize the principal's optimal payoff guarantee. We find that linear contracts are robustly optimal not only in static settings, but also in dynamic environments with exploration.
