论文标题
区域气候政策中的合作与竞争如何出现：大米作为一种充满活力的游戏
How Cooperation and Competition Arise in Regional Climate Policies: RICE as a Dynamic Game
论文作者
论文摘要
用于研究气候变化地理经济学的最广泛使用的模型之一是气候和经济（大米）的区域综合模型。在本文中，我们调查了从游戏理论和最佳控制的角度来看，在水稻框架下，区域气候政策的合作与竞争是如何出现的。首先，我们表明米模型本质上是一个动态的游戏。其次，我们研究了这种稻米动态游戏的合作和非合作解决方案。在合作环境中，我们调查了全球社会福利平衡，从而最大程度地提高了整个地区的加权和累积社会福利。接下来，我们将各区域分为两个群集：开发和发展，并根据帕累托最优性观察社会福利边界。我们还提出了一种退化的地平线方法，以近似于鲁棒性和计算效率的全球社会福利均衡。对于非合作设置，我们研究了大米游戏的最佳响应动力学和开环NASH平衡。提出了一种用于动态游戏（RBA-DG）的递归最佳响应算法，以描述动态游戏的最佳响应决策序列，这表明当通过数值研究应用于稻米游戏时，这表明与开环NASH平衡的融合。我们还研究了稻米游戏的在线退缩反馈决策。提出了一种用于动态游戏（RHFA-DG）的后退视野反馈算法。所有这些提出的解决方案概念都是使用最新更新的参数和数据实现和开源的。结果揭示了如何使用游戏理论来促进国际谈判，以就区域气候变化政策达成共识，以及合作和竞争性的区域关系如何影响我们未来的气候变化。
One of the most widely used models for studying the geographical economics of climate change is the Regional Integrated model of Climate and the Economy (RICE). In this paper, we investigate how cooperation and competition arise in regional climate policies under the RICE framework from the standpoints of game theory and optimal control. First, we show that the RICE model is inherently a dynamic game. Second, we study both cooperative and non-cooperative solutions to this RICE dynamic game. In cooperative settings, we investigate the global social welfare equilibrium that maximizes the weighted and cumulative social welfare across regions. We next divide the regions into two clusters: developed and developing, and look at the social welfare frontier under the notion of Pareto optimality. We also present a receding horizon approach to approximate the global social welfare equilibrium for robustness and computational efficiency. For non-cooperative settings, we study best-response dynamics and open-loop Nash equilibrium of the RICE game. A Recursive Best-response Algorithm for Dynamic Games (RBA-DG) is proposed to describe the sequences of best-response decisions for dynamic games, which indicates convergence to open-loop Nash equilibrium when applied to the RICE game by numerical studies. We also study online receding horizon feedback decisions of the RICE game. A Receding Horizon Feedback Algorithm for Dynamic Games (RHFA-DG) is proposed. All these proposed solution concepts are implemented and open sourced using the latest updated parameters and data. The results reveal how game theory may be used to facilitate international negotiations towards consensus on regional climate-change mitigation policies, as well as how cooperative and competitive regional relations shape climate change for our future.
