论文标题
利用验证者的难题在比特币上花费一倍
Leveraging the Verifier's Dilemma to Double Spend in Bitcoin
论文作者
论文摘要
我们描述和分析了灭亡矿业，这是一种新颖的块矿业策略，它通过从私人维护的连锁店中释放块标头，使以利润驱动的矿工在公共连锁店进行有用的工作。然后，我们引入了双私人链（DPC）攻击，该攻击旨在双重支出通过间歇地将部分哈希力量灭绝采矿来提高其成功率。我们详细介绍了DPC攻击的马尔可夫决策过程，使用蒙特卡洛模拟评估其双重支出成功率。我们表明，DPC攻击降低了比特币的安全性，在有利润驱动的矿工的存在下，这些矿工在开采之前不等待验证块的交易。
We describe and analyze perishing mining, a novel block-withholding mining strategy that lures profit-driven miners away from doing useful work on the public chain by releasing block headers from a privately maintained chain. We then introduce the dual private chain (DPC) attack, where an adversary that aims at double spending increases its success rate by intermittently dedicating part of its hash power to perishing mining. We detail the DPC attack's Markov decision process, evaluate its double spending success rate using Monte Carlo simulations. We show that the DPC attack lowers Bitcoin's security bound in the presence of profit-driven miners that do not wait to validate the transactions of a block before mining on it.
