论文标题
驾驶员地点收获骄傲的攻击
Driver Locations Harvesting Attack on pRide
论文作者
论文摘要
乘车服务(RHS)中的隐私保护旨在保护驾驶员和骑手的隐私。骄傲,发表在IEEE Trans。车辆技术2021,是一种基于预测的保护RHS协议,可将骑手与最佳驾驶员相匹配。在协议中,服务提供商(SP)同派计算驱动程序和骑手加密位置之间的欧几里得距离。骑手使用通过新骑行出口预测增强的解密距离选择了最佳驱动程序。为了提高驾驶员选择的有效性,本文提出了一个增强的版本,每个驾驶员都会在其网格的每个角落加密距离。为了阻止骑手使用这些距离发射推理攻击,SP在与骑手共享之前对这些距离蒙蔽了双眼。在这项工作中,我们提出了一场被动攻击,一个诚实但有趣的对手骑手提出了一个骑行请求,并收到与SP盲目的距离,可以恢复用于盲目距离的常数。使用不盲的距离,骑手到驾驶员距离和Google最近的道路API,对手可以获得响应驱动程序的确切位置。我们对四个不同城市的随机驾驶员位置进行实验。我们的实验表明,我们可以确定参加增强骄傲协议的至少80%的驾驶员的确切位置。
Privacy preservation in Ride-Hailing Services (RHS) is intended to protect privacy of drivers and riders. pRide, published in IEEE Trans. Vehicular Technology 2021, is a prediction based privacy-preserving RHS protocol to match riders with an optimum driver. In the protocol, the Service Provider (SP) homomorphically computes Euclidean distances between encrypted locations of drivers and rider. Rider selects an optimum driver using decrypted distances augmented by a new-ride-emergence prediction. To improve the effectiveness of driver selection, the paper proposes an enhanced version where each driver gives encrypted distances to each corner of her grid. To thwart a rider from using these distances to launch an inference attack, the SP blinds these distances before sharing them with the rider. In this work, we propose a passive attack where an honest-but-curious adversary rider who makes a single ride request and receives the blinded distances from SP can recover the constants used to blind the distances. Using the unblinded distances, rider to driver distance and Google Nearest Road API, the adversary can obtain the precise locations of responding drivers. We conduct experiments with random on-road driver locations for four different cities. Our experiments show that we can determine the precise locations of at least 80% of the drivers participating in the enhanced pRide protocol.