论文标题
超越容量：电力可靠性义务中的合同形式
Beyond capacity: contractual form in electricity reliability obligations
论文作者
论文摘要
自由化的电力市场通常包括资源充足的机制，这些机制需要消费者在实时运营之前及时与一代资源收缩。尽管行政上定义的机制最常见的是能力义务的形式，但有效的市场将采用各种各样的安排，适合于市场参与者的风险概况和胃口。本文考虑了嵌入在替代资源充足性合同设计中的财务对冲如何引起风险规避投资者的不同反应，这对资源组合和市场结构产生了影响。我们构建了一个随机均衡模型，该模型描述了一个竞争性市场，并在不同的合同制度下以不完整的风险交易和计算投资平衡。两个政策建议结果。首先，为避免通过挤出其他形式的风险共享来造成低效率，系统运营商应允许通过其他方式收缩的资源选择退出强制性容量机制，并贡献从行政定义的需求曲线中减去的那些要求。其次，如果他们希望宣传单一的合同表格，监管机构应考虑用形状的远期能源合同来代替现有的类似期权的容量机制。除了这些建议之外，我们还讨论了自由化系统在寻求促进可靠性和竞争成果时面临的紧张局势。
Liberalized electricity markets often include resource adequacy mechanisms that require consumers to contract with generation resources well in advance of real-time operations. While administratively defined mechanisms have most commonly taken the form of a capacity obligation, efficient markets would feature a broad array of arrangements adapted to the risk profiles and appetites of market participants. This article considers how the financial hedge embedded in alternative resource adequacy contract designs can induce different responses from risk-averse investors, with consequences for the resource mix and market structure. We construct a stochastic equilibrium model describing a competitive market with incomplete risk trading and compute investment equilibria under different contracting regimes. Two policy recommendations result. First, to avoid creating inefficiency by crowding out other forms of risk sharing, system operators should allow resources contracted through other means to opt out of mandatory capacity mechanisms, with their contribution to those requirements subtracted from administratively defined demand curves. Second, if they wish to promote a single contractual form, regulators should consider replacing existing option-like capacity mechanisms with a shaped forward contract for energy. Beyond these recommendations, we discuss the tension that liberalized systems face in seeking to promote both reliability and competitive outcomes.
