论文标题
使信息更有价值
Making Information More Valuable
论文作者
论文摘要
我们研究代理商决策问题的变化会增加她的信息价值。我们证明，只有当代理商在信念中减少形式的回报变得更加凸出时，信息就会变得更加有价值。当转换对应于添加一个动作时，当且仅当一个简单的几何条件保持时，凸度的必要增加就会发生，而这是自然而然地延伸到多个动作的。我们将这些发现应用于两种情况：一个垄断筛查问题，其中善是信息和委派与信息获取的委托。
We study what changes to an agent's decision problem increase her value for information. We prove that information becomes more valuable if and only if the agent's reduced-form payoff in her belief becomes more convex. When the transformation corresponds to the addition of an action, the requisite increase in convexity occurs if and only if a simple geometric condition holds, which extends in a natural way to the addition of multiple actions. We apply these findings to two scenarios: a monopolistic screening problem in which the good is information and delegation with information acquisition.
