论文标题
lookahead拍卖
Lookahead Auctions with Pooling
论文作者
论文摘要
由罗恩（Ronen）引入的Lookahead拍卖（la）是用于在多个买家中出售单个商品的拍卖格式，这被认为比最简单，更公平。确实，它通过对称上升价格的过程匿名选择了临时赢家，然后才使用个性化的发布价格。 LA拍卖会提取至少1/2的最佳收入，即使在相关的价值分布下也是如此。即使对于两个具有独立价值的买家，这种界限也很紧。我们介绍了洛杉矶的自然扩展，称为lookahead，带有合并（圈）。单圈拍卖以洛杉矶为主，有一个差异：它使卖方可以在上升价格阶段将一系列值汇总在一起，并将其对待相同；因此，它保留了洛杉矶的简单性和公平性。我们的主要结果是，这种简单的合并业务将独立买家的收入保证从最佳收入的1/2提高到4/7。我们还给出互补的负面结果，表明对于任意相关的先验，圈圈不能比1/2近似更好。
A Lookahead Auction (LA), introduced by Ronen, is an auction format for the sale of a single item among multiple buyers, which is considered simpler and more fair than the optimal auction. Indeed, it anonymously selects a provisional winner by a symmetric ascending-price process, and only then uses a personalized posted price. A LA auction extracts at least 1/2 of the optimal revenue, even under a correlated value distribution. This bound is tight, even for 2 buyers with independent values. We introduce a natural extension of LA, called lookahead with pooling (LAP). A LAP auction proceeds as LA, with one difference: it allows the seller to pool together a range of values during the ascending-price stage, and treat them the same; thus, it preserves the simplicity and fairness of LA. Our main result is that this simple pooling operation improves the revenue guarantees for independent buyers from 1/2 to 4/7 of the optimal revenue. We also give a complementary negative result, showing that for arbitrary correlated priors LAP cannot do better than 1/2 approximation.
