论文标题
非抚养者的力量
The Power of Non-Superpowers
论文作者
论文摘要
我们提出了一种游戏理论模型，以研究具有异性偏好和end赋的非抚养者如何影响影响力领域的超级大国竞争。两个超级大国通过提供俱乐部商品来打出一场Stackelberg游戏。他们的公用事业取决于非抚养者，他们在外部性面前组成联盟以加入俱乐部。取决于非抚养者的特征的联盟形成影响了超级大国的行为及其俱乐部的规模。我们基于数据的子游戏完美平衡的模拟捕获了美中竞赛如何取决于其他国家。
We propose a game-theoretic model to investigate how non-superpowers with heterogenous preferences and endowments shape the superpower competition for a sphere of influence. Two superpowers play a Stackelberg game by providing club goods. Their utility depends on non-superpowers who form coalitions to join a club in the presence of externality. The coalition formation, which depends on the characteristics of non-superpowers, influences the behavior of superpowers and thus the size of their clubs. Our data-based simulations of the subgame perfect equilbirum capture how the US-China competition depends on other countries.
