论文标题
Invicloak：Web内容分布中隐私和性能的端到端方法
InviCloak: An End-to-End Approach to Privacy and Performance in Web Content Distribution
论文作者
论文摘要
在当今的Web生态系统中，使用内容输送网络（CDN）的网站与CDN共享其传输层安全性（TLS）私钥或会话密钥。在本文中，我们介绍了Invicloak的设计和实施，该系统可保护用户和网站的私人通信的机密性和完整性，而无需更改TLS或升级CDN。 Invicloak使用现有的DNS基础架构来建立轻巧但安全且实用的密钥分配机制，以分发与网站域名相关的新公钥。 Web客户端和网站可以使用新密钥对来构建TLS内部的加密频道。 Invicloak可容纳当前的Web生态系统。网站可以单方面部署Invicloak，而无需客户参与，以防止CDN内部的被动攻击者窃听其通信。如果客户端还安装了Invicloak的浏览器扩展程序，则客户和网站可以在CDN内有活动攻击者的情况下实现端到端机密和未损害的通信。我们的评估表明，Invicloak将现实网页的中间页面加载时间（PLT）从2.0s增加到2.1，这比最先进的TEE解决方案的中位数PLT（2.8s）小。
In today's web ecosystem, a website that uses a Content Delivery Network (CDN) shares its Transport Layer Security (TLS) private key or session key with the CDN. In this paper, we present the design and implementation of InviCloak, a system that protects the confidentiality and integrity of a user and a website's private communications without changing TLS or upgrading a CDN. InviCloak builds a lightweight but secure and practical key distribution mechanism using the existing DNS infrastructure to distribute a new public key associated with a website's domain name. A web client and a website can use the new key pair to build an encryption channel inside TLS. InviCloak accommodates the current web ecosystem. A website can deploy InviCloak unilaterally without a client's involvement to prevent a passive attacker inside a CDN from eavesdropping on their communications. If a client also installs InviCloak's browser extension, the client and the website can achieve end-to-end confidential and untampered communications in the presence of an active attacker inside a CDN. Our evaluation shows that InviCloak increases the median page load times (PLTs) of realistic web pages from 2.0s to 2.1s, which is smaller than the median PLTs (2.8s) of a state-of-the-art TEE-based solution.
