论文标题
PBAG:一项基于隐私的基于区块链的身份验证协议
PBAG: A Privacy-Preserving Blockchain-based Authentication Protocol with Global-updated Commitment in IoV
论文作者
论文摘要
车辆互联网(IOV)越来越多地用作通过在车辆和基础设施等实体之间建立联系来传播关键信息的媒介。在消息传输过程中,隐私的身份验证被认为是针对攻击者和恶意信息的第一道防线。为了实现更安全和稳定的通信环境,提出了大量基于区块链的身份验证方案的数量。乍一看,现有方法提供了强大的体系结构并实现透明的身份验证。但是,在这些方案中,验证者必须提前连接到区块链网络,并使用智能合约来完成身份验证,从而延长延迟。为了纠正此限制,我们提出了一个基于隐私的区块链的身份验证协议(PBAG),其中根权限(RA)生成了与每种授权车辆发行的证书相对应的唯一评估证明。同时,RA根据所有有效证书广播了公共全球承诺。通过通过双线性配对利用全球承诺,将有效地证明该车辆是有效证明是授权用户的,而不是查询存储在区块链中的证书。此外,我们的计划可以防止配备无效证书的车辆完成身份验证,从而避免了检查证书吊销清单(CRL)的耗时。最后,我们的计划提供了隐私属性,例如匿名性和不链接性。它允许基于评估证明并在发生争议时实现身份的可追溯性。该模拟表明,在支持批处理机制下的平均验证时间为0.36ms,表现优于现有方案至少63.7%。
Internet of Vehicles(IoV) is increasingly used as a medium to propagate critical information via establishing connections between entities such as vehicles and infrastructures. During message transmission, privacy-preserving authentication is considered as the first line of defence against attackers and malicious information. To achieve a more secure and stable communication environment, ever-increasing numbers of blockchain-based authentication schemes are proposed. At first glance, existing approaches provide robust architectures and achieve transparent authentication. However, in these schemes, verifiers must connect to the blockchain network in advance and accomplish the authentication with smart contracts, which prolongs the latency. To remedy this limit, we propose a privacy-preserving blockchain-based authentication protocol(PBAG), where Root Authority(RA) generates a unique evaluation proof corresponding to the issued certificate for each authorized vehicle. Meanwhile, RA broadcasts a public global commitment based on all valid certificates. Instead of querying certificates stored in the blockchain, the vehicle will be efficiently proved to be an authorized user by utilizing the global commitment through bilinear pairing. Moreover, our scheme can prevent vehicles equipped with invalid certificates from accomplishing the authentication, thus avoiding the time-consuming for checking Certificate Revocation List (CRL). Finally, our scheme provides privacy properties such as anonymity and unlinkability. It allows anonymous authentication based on evaluation proofs and achieves traceability of identity in the event of a dispute. The simulation demonstrates that the average time of verification is 0.36ms under the batch-enabled mechanism, outperforming existing schemes by at least 63.7%.