论文标题
金融监管机构是否为公众利益行动？贝叶斯潜在阶级估计框架，用于评估对银行危机的监管响应
Do financial regulators act in the public's interest? A Bayesian latent class estimation framework for assessing regulatory responses to banking crises
论文作者
论文摘要
当银行在金融危机中失败时，公众批评监管机构救助或清算特定银行，尤其是那些由于规模或优势而引起关注的银行。但是，对监管机构进行的全面评估需要检查其所有决定，而不仅仅是特定的决定，而不是监管机构的双重目标，即保持财务稳定性，同时阻止道德危害。在本文中，我们开发了一个贝叶斯潜在阶级估算框架，以评估这些竞争目标的监管机构，并评估其针对旨在遏制道德危害激励措施的银行行为理论研究建议的决议规则的决策。拟议的估计框架介绍了监管机构在解决失败的银行方面的决定基础的未观察到的异质性，并提供了一种纪律处分的统计方法，以推断出他们为公共利益而行动。我们的结果表明，在1980年代的危机中，美国银行监管机构的决议决策与建议的决策规则是一致的，而美国的储蓄和贷款（S＆L）监管机构最终面临1989年的破产，损失了1320亿美元的纳税人的损失。基于此评估的及时干预措施可以纠正S＆L调节器的决策结构，并防止纳税人损失。
When banks fail amidst financial crises, the public criticizes regulators for bailing out or liquidating specific banks, especially the ones that gain attention due to their size or dominance. A comprehensive assessment of regulators, however, requires examining all their decisions, and not just specific ones, against the regulator's dual objective of preserving financial stability while discouraging moral hazard. In this article, we develop a Bayesian latent class estimation framework to assess regulators on these competing objectives and evaluate their decisions against resolution rules recommended by theoretical studies of bank behavior designed to contain moral hazard incentives. The proposed estimation framework addresses the unobserved heterogeneity underlying regulator's decisions in resolving failed banks and provides a disciplined statistical approach for inferring if they acted in the public interest. Our results reveal that during the crises of 1980's, the U.S. banking regulator's resolution decisions were consistent with recommended decision rules, while the U.S. savings and loans (S&L) regulator, which ultimately faced insolvency in 1989 at a cost of $132 billion to the taxpayer, had deviated from such recommendations. Timely interventions based on this evaluation could have redressed the S&L regulator's decision structure and prevented losses to taxpayers.
