论文标题
子游戏的完美NASH平衡，用于有限计划的动态定价竞赛
Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for dynamic pricing competition with finite planning horizon
论文作者
论文摘要
具有固定能力，同质产品和价格敏感的客户购买决策是众多收入管理系统的主要区别特征。即使有两个或三个竞争对手，竞争仍然很激烈。本文研究了具有易腐烂资产的寡头市场价格竞争的子游戏完美纳什均衡。卖家每个人都有一个无法补充的商品的单位，他们竞争设定价格以在有限的销售范围内出售商品。每个时期，买家都希望有一个单位，每个时期的买家数量是随机的。所有卖家的价格均可用于买家，搜索是无偿的。使用随机动态编程方法，可以从剩余时期和当前时间需求结构的一次性价格竞争游戏中获得卖家的最佳响应。假设二进制需求模型，我们证明了双重垄断模型具有独特的NASH平衡，寡头模型并未揭示有关特定度量的价格分散。我们说明，在考虑广义需求模型时，双重垄断模型具有独特的混合策略NASH平衡，而寡头模型具有独特的对称混合策略NASH平衡。
Having fixed capacities, homogeneous products and price sensitive customer purchase decision are primary distinguishing characteristics of numerous revenue management systems. Even with two or three rivals, competition is still highly fierce. This paper studies sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of a price competition in an oligopoly market with perishable assets. Sellers each has one unit of a good that cannot be replenished, and they compete in setting prices to sell their good over a finite sales horizon. Each period, buyers desire one unit of the good and the number of buyers coming to the market in each period is random. All sellers' prices are accessible for buyers, and search is costless. Using stochastic dynamic programming methods, the best response of sellers can be obtained from a one-shot price competition game regarding remained periods and the current-time demand structure. Assuming a binary demand model, we demonstrate that the duopoly model has a unique Nash equilibrium and the oligopoly model does not reveal price dispersion with respect to a particular metric. We illustrate that, when considering a generalized demand model, the duopoly model has a unique mixed strategy Nash equilibrium while the oligopoly model has a unique symmetric mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.
