论文标题
阻止者假定投票权的措施
The Blocker Postulates for Measures of Voting Power
论文作者
论文摘要
提议的投票权衡量应满足两个条件是合理的：首先，必须在概念上证明它是合理的，以捕捉投票权的直觉含义；其次，它必须满足合理的假设。本文研究了一组假定的，适合先验投票权，涉及二元投票游戏中的阻滞剂（或否决者）。我们指定并激励五个这样的假设，即，两个亚additivity阻滞剂假设，两个最小功率阻滞剂假设，每条以弱和强的版本，以及附加的阻滞剂假设。然后，我们测试了三种投票能力的衡量标准，即经典的Penrose-Banzhaf测度，经典的Shapley-Shubik指数以及新提出的递归度量，可以满足这些假设。我们发现第一个措施失败了四个假设，第二个措施失败了两个，而仅第三个措施就满足了所有五个假设。因此，这项工作增加了递归度量的合理性，作为对投票权的合理措施。
A proposed measure of voting power should satisfy two conditions to be plausible: first, it must be conceptually justified, capturing the intuitive meaning of what voting power is; second, it must satisfy reasonable postulates. This paper studies a set of postulates, appropriate for a priori voting power, concerning blockers (or vetoers) in a binary voting game. We specify and motivate five such postulates, namely, two subadditivity blocker postulates, two minimum-power blocker postulates, each in weak and strong versions, and the added-blocker postulate. We then test whether three measures of voting power, namely the classic Penrose-Banzhaf measure, the classic Shapley-Shubik index, and the newly proposed Recursive Measure, satisfy these postulates. We find that the first measure fails four of the postulates, the second fails two, while the third alone satisfies all five postulates. This work consequently adds to the plausibility of the Recursive Measure as a reasonable measure of voting power.
