论文标题
在线文化市场中调和质量与流行性二分法
Reconciling the Quality vs Popularity Dichotomy in Online Cultural Markets
论文作者
论文摘要
我们提出了一个理想化的在线文化市场的简单模型，其中$ n $项目具有隐藏质量指标，建议用户通过排名算法可能会因当前项目的受欢迎程度而有偏见。我们的目标是更好地了解众所周知的事实的基本机制，即受欢迎程度偏见可以防止更高质量的物品比低质量的物品更受欢迎，从而在质量和受欢迎程度排名之间产生不良的不对准。我们这样做的假设是，时间/注意力有限，能够仅在项目的随机子集中区分最佳质量。我们发现存在有害政权的存在，在这种有害政权中，不当使用受欢迎程度会严重损害质量的出现，以及一种良性制度，在这种良性方案中，明智地使用受欢迎程度，并代表用户对小额歧视努力，保证了质量和普及等级排名的完美一致。我们的发现阐明了算法流行度偏见对质量结果的影响，并可能为技术社会文化市场的更有原则的机制提供了信息。
We propose a simple model of an idealized online cultural market in which $N$ items, endowed with a hidden quality metric, are recommended to users by a ranking algorithm possibly biased by the current items' popularity. Our goal is to better understand the underlying mechanisms of the well-known fact that popularity bias can prevent higher-quality items from becoming more popular than lower-quality items, producing an undesirable misalignment between quality and popularity rankings. We do so under the assumption that users, having limited time/attention, are able to discriminate the best-quality only within a random subset of the items. We discover the existence of a harmful regime in which improper use of popularity can seriously compromise the emergence of quality, and a benign regime in which wise use of popularity, coupled with a small discrimination effort on behalf of users, guarantees the perfect alignment of quality and popularity ranking. Our findings clarify the effects of algorithmic popularity bias on quality outcomes, and may inform the design of more principled mechanisms for techno-social cultural markets.
