论文标题
非线性控制系统对隐形传感器攻击的弹性
Resiliency of Nonlinear Control Systems to Stealthy Sensor Attacks
论文作者
论文摘要
在这项工作中，我们专注于分析非线性动力控制系统对隐身传感器攻击的脆弱性。我们首先通过利用Neyman-Pearson的引理来定义最一般形式的隐形攻击概念；具体而言，如果攻击是从任何入侵检测器（即未发现）隐身的攻击，即检测的概率并不比随机猜测更好。然后，我们提供了一个足够的条件，在该条件下，由于攻击，非线性控制系统容易受到隐身攻击的影响。特别是，我们表明，如果闭环系统在开放环工厂的逐步不稳定时逐渐稳定，那么该系统很容易受到对传感器的隐身且有影响力的攻击。最后，我们在案例研究中说明了结果。
In this work, we focus on analyzing vulnerability of nonlinear dynamical control systems to stealthy sensor attacks. We start by defining the notion of stealthy attacks in the most general form by leveraging Neyman-Pearson lemma; specifically, an attack is considered to be stealthy if it is stealthy from (i.e., undetected by) any intrusion detector -- i.e., the probability of the detection is not better than a random guess. We then provide a sufficient condition under which a nonlinear control system is vulnerable to stealthy attacks, in terms of moving the system to an unsafe region due to the attacks. In particular, we show that if the closed-loop system is incrementally exponentially stable while the open-loop plant is incrementally unstable, then the system is vulnerable to stealthy yet impactful attacks on sensors. Finally, we illustrate our results on a case study.
