论文标题
平衡乘车电动汽车舰队充电的价格机制
A Pricing Mechanism for Balancing the Charging of Ride-Hailing Electric Vehicle Fleets
论文作者
论文摘要
乘车服务和电动汽车都变得越来越受欢迎，乘车车辆对车辆的充电管理很可能是骑车公司在不久的将来运营的重要组成部分。在此激励的情况下，我们提出了一种用于收费管理的游戏理论模型，我们认为正是舰队经营者希望最大程度地减少其运营成本，其中包括充电价格。为了避免人满为患的充电站，中央当局将设计定价政策，以激励车辆在充电站之间扩散，并在几家乘车公司争夺资源的环境中。我们表明，有可能构建定价政策，使公司之间的NASH平衡遵循中央当局的目标价值，当时所需的负载是可行的。此外，我们为计算平衡的分散算法提供了分散的算法，并以数字示例结论了该论文。
Both ride-hailing services and electric vehicles are becoming increasingly popular and it is likely that charging management of the ride-hailing vehicles will be a significant part of the ride-hailing company's operation in the near future. Motivated by this, we propose a game theoretic model for charging management, where we assume that it is the fleet-operator that wants to minimize its operational cost, which among others include the price of charging. To avoid overcrowded charging stations, a central authority will design pricing policies to incentivize the vehicles to spread out among the charging stations, in a setting where several ride-hailing companies compete about the resources. We show that it is possible to construct pricing policies that make the Nash-equilibrium between the companies follow the central authority's target value when the desired load is feasible. Moreover, we provide a decentralized algorithm for computation of the equilibrium and conclude the paper with a numerical example illustrating the results.
