论文标题
平均付款游戏中的子游戏完美平衡（期刊版本）
Subgame-perfect Equilibria in Mean-payoff Games (journal version)
论文作者
论文摘要
在本文中，我们提供了在具有平均值目标的有限图上玩的无限持续时间游戏中所有子游戏完美平衡的有效表征。为此，我们介绍了要求的概念以及谈判函数的概念。我们确定SPE支持的戏剧正是与谈判函数的固定点一致的戏剧。最后，我们使用该表征来证明SPE阈值问题在文献中保持开放是可以决定的。
In this paper, we provide an effective characterization of all the subgame-perfect equilibria in infinite duration games played on finite graphs with mean-payoff objectives. To this end, we introduce the notion of requirement, and the notion of negotiation function. We establish that the plays that are supported by SPEs are exactly those that are consistent with a fixed point of the negotiation function. Finally, we use that characterization to prove that the SPE threshold problem, who status was left open in the literature, is decidable.
