论文标题
特征的互补兼容性的表征
Characterization of Incentive Compatibility of an Ex-Ante Constrained Player
论文作者
论文摘要
我们考虑了标准贝叶斯机制的一种变体，在该机制中，参与者以前的方式评估他们的结果和约束。这种模型捕捉了一种现代在线广告的主要形式，广告商在一段时间内关注她/他的预期效用，而她/他的类型可能会随着时间而改变。我们对这种贝叶斯机制的激励兼容性（IC）问题感兴趣。在机制环境的非常温和的条件下，我们通过税收原则对IC进行了全面表征，并且可能令人惊讶地表明，这种IC机制的特征是所谓的自动订购机制，这些机制在在线广告行业中普遍存在。
We consider a variant of the standard Bayesian mechanism, where players evaluate their outcomes and constraints in an ex-ante manner. Such a model captures a major form of modern online advertising where an advertiser is concerned with her/his expected utility over a time period and her/his type may change over time. We are interested in the incentive compatibility (IC) problem of such Bayesian mechanism. Under very mild conditions on the mechanism environments, we give a full characterization of IC via the taxation principle and show, perhaps surprisingly, that such IC mechanisms are fully characterized by the so-called auto-bidding mechanisms, which are pervasively fielded in the online advertising industry.
