论文标题
在双头垄断中进行广告竞赛的平均现场模型
Mean Field Model for an Advertising Competition in a Duopoly
论文作者
论文摘要
在这项研究中，我们分析了一项双重垄断的广告竞赛。我们考虑了两个不同的平衡概念。我们将双头垄断中的公司建立为主要参与者，而消费者则为次要参与者。在我们的第一个游戏模型中，我们在所有玩家之间识别Nash Equilibria（NE）。接下来，我们将模型构架，以导致搜索多领导者Nash Equilibria（MLF-NE）。这种方法让人想起Stackelberg游戏的某种意义上，主要参与者设计了他们的广告政策，假设次要玩家是理性的，并且在他们之间达到了纳什的平衡。这种合理性假设将主要参与者之间的竞争减少到了2场比赛。在解决了平衡概念的这两个模型之后，我们分析了两种不同平衡集的相似性和差异。
In this study, we analyze an advertising competition in a duopoly. We consider two different notions of equilibrium. We model the companies in the duopoly as major players, and the consumers as minor players. In our first game model we identify Nash Equilibria (NE) between all the players. Next we frame the model to lead to the search for Multi-Leader-Follower Nash Equilibria (MLF-NE). This approach is reminiscent of Stackelberg games in the sense that the major players design their advertisement policies assuming that the minor players are rational and settle in a Nash Equilibrium among themselves. This rationality assumption reduces the competition between the major players to a 2-player game. After solving these two models for the notions of equilibrium, we analyze the similarities and differences of the two different sets of equilibria.
