论文标题
在不断变化的环境中的固定社会学习
Stationary social learning in a changing environment
论文作者
论文摘要
我们考虑在不断变化的世界中的社会学习。仅当代理人定期采取新的信息而限制社会学习价值时，社会才能对状态的反应变化。当国家接近持久性时，大多数代理通常会选择相同动作的共识。不过，共识行动与国家并不完全相关，因为社会在国家发生变化之后表现出惯性。当信号更精确时，即使代理人绘制了过去的动作样本，惯性的阶段可能会更长，因为动作在样本中变得太相关，从而降低了信息性和福利。
We consider social learning in a changing world. Society can remain responsive to state changes only if agents regularly act upon fresh information, which limits the value of social learning. When the state is close to persistent, a consensus whereby most agents choose the same action typically emerges. The consensus action is not perfectly correlated with the state though, because the society exhibits inertia following state changes. Phases of inertia may be longer when signals are more precise, even if agents draw large samples of past actions, as actions then become too correlated within samples, thereby reducing informativeness and welfare.
