论文标题

私人重型击球手轻量级技术

Lightweight Techniques for Private Heavy Hitters

论文作者

Boneh, Dan, Boyle, Elette, Corrigan-Gibbs, Henry, Gilboa, Niv, Ishai, Yuval

论文摘要

本文介绍了Poplar,这是一种解决私人重型问题问题的新系统。在此问题中,有很多客户端和一小部分数据收集服务器。每个客户都有一个私人的bottring。服务器希望恢复所有流行字符串的集合,而无需了解任何客户的字符串。例如,Web浏览器供应商可以使用Poplar来弄清哪些主页很受欢迎,而无需学习任何用户的主页。我们还考虑了更简单的私人子集问题问题,在这些问题中,服务器要计算有多少客户在特定集合中包含字符串而不向客户端透露此设置。 Poplar使用两个数据收集服务器,并且在协议运行中,每个客户端仅向服务器发送一条消息。 Poplar保护客户隐私免受一台服务器的任意不当行为,我们的方法不需要公开密码(安全渠道除外),也不需要通用多方计算。取而代之的是,我们依靠增量分布点功能,这是一种新的加密工具,允许客户端在指数级的大二进制树节点上简洁地秘密共享标签,前提是该树具有单个非零路径。一路上,我们开发了新的通用工具,以在分布式点功能的应用中提供恶意安全。

This paper presents Poplar, a new system for solving the private heavy-hitters problem. In this problem, there are many clients and a small set of data-collection servers. Each client holds a private bitstring. The servers want to recover the set of all popular strings, without learning anything else about any client's string. A web-browser vendor, for instance, can use Poplar to figure out which homepages are popular, without learning any user's homepage. We also consider the simpler private subset-histogram problem, in which the servers want to count how many clients hold strings in a particular set without revealing this set to the clients. Poplar uses two data-collection servers and, in a protocol run, each client send sends only a single message to the servers. Poplar protects client privacy against arbitrary misbehavior by one of the servers and our approach requires no public-key cryptography (except for secure channels), nor general-purpose multiparty computation. Instead, we rely on incremental distributed point functions, a new cryptographic tool that allows a client to succinctly secret-share the labels on the nodes of an exponentially large binary tree, provided that the tree has a single non-zero path. Along the way, we develop new general tools for providing malicious security in applications of distributed point functions.

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