论文标题
第二次价格拍卖中合同履行的最佳实时出价政策
Optimal Real-time Bidding Policies for Contract Fulfillment in Second Price Auctions
论文作者
论文摘要
我们研究了一套合同义务所引起的实时出价问题，该义务表明公司在实时拍卖中赢得了指定数量的异质印象或广告位置。合同指定目标标准的项目（可能是重叠的）和供应要求。使用Pontryagin的最大原理，我们表明可以将所得的连续时间和时间不均匀的计划问题简化为有限的尺寸凸优化问题，并求解为最佳性。此外，我们还提供算法，以随着时间的流逝而更新招标计划。最后，我们根据实际数据提供数值结果，并显示与生产转移问题的联系。
We study a real-time bidding problem resulting from a set of contractual obligations stipulating that a firm win a specified number of heterogeneous impressions or ad placements over a defined duration in a real-time auction. The contracts specify item targeting criteria (which may be overlapping), and a supply requirement. Using the Pontryagin maximum principle, we show that the resulting continuous time and time inhomogeneous planning problem can be reduced into a finite dimensional convex optimization problem and solved to optimality. In addition, we provide algorithms to update the bidding plan over time via a receding horizon. Finally, we provide numerical results based on real data and show a connection to production-transportation problems.
