论文标题
带有光伏电网中的智能发行电网发动攻击
Power Injection Attacks in Smart Distribution Grids with Photovoltaics
论文作者
论文摘要
为了保护智能分配网格免受入侵的影响，重要的是要了解攻击的可能风险和影响。我们研究了针对光伏资源高渗透的智能分配网格物理层的最坏情况攻击策略。我们既是最糟糕的攻击信号，也是最差的攻击位置：最差的攻击信号是一个步骤功能，它在最后阶段切换符号，最糟糕的攻击位置是网格变电站阻抗最大的节点。欧洲基准模型的数值示例验证了开发的结果。最后，理论和数值结果均用于讨论针对电力注射攻击的可行防御策略。
In order to protect smart distribution grids from intrusions, it is important to understand possible risks and impacts of attacks. We study the worst-case attack strategy of a power injection attack against the physical layer of a smart distribution grid with a high penetration of photovoltaic resources. We derive both the worst attack signal and worst attack location: The worst attack signal is a step function which switches its sign at the final stage, and the worst attack location is the node with the largest impedance to the grid substation. Numerical examples on a European benchmark model verify the developed results. Finally, both theoretical and numerical results are used to discuss feasible defense strategies against power injection attacks.
