论文标题
检测器对反事实量子密钥分布的盲目攻击
Detector blinding attacks on counterfactual quantum key distribution
论文作者
论文摘要
反事实量子密钥分布协议允许双方使用不安全的渠道和身份验证的公共通信建立一个通用的秘密密钥。与许多其他量子密钥分布协议相反，用于确定每个位的量子状态的一部分永远不会离开传输侧，这阻碍了一些攻击。我们展示了如何将检测器盲目攻击适应此设置。在盲目攻击中，封闭式雪崩光电二极管检测器被禁用或被迫使用明亮的光脉冲激活。我们提出了两项使用此能力来损害反事实量子密钥分布的安全性的攻击。第一个是一般攻击，但在技术上要求（攻击者必须能够减少渠道损失的一半）。第二次攻击可以通过易于访问的技术进行部署，并用于实现单个光子源近似相干状态的实现。攻击是光子数截面攻击和第一次盲目攻击的组合，可以通过易于访问的技术进行部署。拟议的攻击表明，反事实量子密钥分布容易受到检测器的盲目性，并且实验实现应包括针对它的明确对策。
Counterfactual quantum key distribution protocols allow two sides to establish a common secret key using an insecure channel and authenticated public communication. As opposed to many other quantum key distribution protocols, part of the quantum state used to establish each bit never leaves the transmitting side, which hinders some attacks. We show how to adapt detector blinding attacks to this setting. In blinding attacks, gated avalanche photodiode detectors are disabled or forced to activate using bright light pulses. We present two attacks that use this ability to compromise the security of counterfactual quantum key distribution. The first is a general attack but technologically demanding (the attacker must be able to reduce the channel loss by half). The second attack could be deployed with easily accessible technology and works for implementations where single photon sources are approximated by attenuated coherent states. The attack is a combination of a photon number splitting attack and the first blinding attack which could be deployed with easily accessible technology. The proposed attacks show counterfactual quantum key distribution is vulnerable to detector blinding and that experimental implementations should include explicit countermeasures against it.
