论文标题
预测有限的对手
Prediction against a limited adversary
论文作者
论文摘要
我们通过对抗性腐败的专家建议研究了预测问题，而对手最多可以腐败一位专家。使用粘度理论中的工具，我们表征了预报员和对手之间游戏价值功能的长期行为。我们在不依赖比较结果的情况下为后悔的增长提供了下层和上限。我们表明，根据对遗憾的描述，游戏的限制行为可能会大不相同。
We study the problem of prediction with expert advice with adversarial corruption where the adversary can at most corrupt one expert. Using tools from viscosity theory, we characterize the long-time behavior of the value function of the game between the forecaster and the adversary. We provide lower and upper bounds for the growth rate of regret without relying on a comparison result. We show that depending on the description of regret, the limiting behavior of the game can significantly differ.
