论文标题
天真的分析平衡
Naive analytics equilibrium
论文作者
论文摘要
我们研究需求敏感性的不确定性相互作用。在我们的解决方案概念（1）中，鉴于其数据分析的复杂水平，以及（2）复杂水平相互响应的最佳响应水平。在随后的均衡企业下，正如经验上观察到的那样，低估了价格弹性，并高估了广告效果。误解导致公司设定价格过高，无法过度广泛。在具有战略补充（替代品）的游戏中，帕累托占主导地位（主导）纳什均衡的利润。将模型应用于团队制作游戏，解释了企业家和销售人员之间过度自信的流行。
We study interactions with uncertainty about demand sensitivity. In our solution concept (1) firms choose seemingly-optimal strategies given the level of sophistication of their data analytics, and (2) the levels of sophistication form best responses to one another. Under the ensuing equilibrium firms underestimate price elasticities and overestimate advertising effectiveness, as observed empirically. The misestimates cause firms to set prices too high and to over-advertise. In games with strategic complements (substitutes), profits Pareto dominate (are dominated by) those of the Nash equilibrium. Applying the model to team production games explains the prevalence of overconfidence among entrepreneurs and salespeople.
