论文标题
流动民主的权力
Power in Liquid Democracy
论文作者
论文摘要
本文为委托代理投票系统发展了权力理论。我们定义了能够衡量选民和代表人的影响的权力指数。使用此索引，我们以公理的方式表征了该索引，我们通过合并代理的寻求权力行为来扩展一个早期的游戏理论模型。我们分析研究了这种模型中纯战略NASH平衡的存在。最后，通过模拟，我们研究了相关参数对模型中功率不平等的出现的影响。
The paper develops a theory of power for delegable proxy voting systems. We define a power index able to measure the influence of both voters and delegators. Using this index, which we characterize axiomatically, we extend an earlier game-theoretic model by incorporating power-seeking behavior by agents. We analytically study the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria in such a model. Finally, by means of simulations, we study the effect of relevant parameters on the emergence of power inequalities in the model.
