论文标题
应该支付勒索软件吗？
Should the Ransomware be Paid?
论文作者
论文摘要
勒索软件已成为近年来最关注的网络风险之一，这导致了全球数百万美元的货币损失。通常，它需要在有限的时间范围内进行一定数量的赎金付款，以解密加密受害者的文件。本文探讨了是否应该从贝叶斯游戏的角度从新颖的游戏理论模型中支付勒索软件。特别是，新模型分析了黑客和受害者不完整信息框架内的赎金支付策略。我们的结果表明，在黑客和受害者的某些轻度条件下，存在纯粹和随机的贝叶斯纳什平衡。当组织被勒索软件攻击妥协时，应支付赎金时应支付赎金时的足够条件。我们进一步研究破裂或恢复的成本和概率如何影响黑客和均衡受害者的预期收益。特别是，发现计算机文件的备份选项并不总是有益的，这实际上取决于相关成本。此外，发现由于潜在的高收益，假勒索软件可能超出预期。还提出了数值示例以进行例证。
Ransomware has emerged as one of the most concerned cyber risks in recent years, which has caused millions of dollars monetary loss over the world. It typically demands a certain amount of ransom payment within a limited timeframe to decrypt the encrypted victim's files. This paper explores whether the ransomware should be paid in a novel game-theoretic model from the perspective of Bayesian game. In particular, the new model analyzes the ransom payment strategies within the framework of incomplete information for both hacker and victim. Our results show that there exist pure and randomized Bayesian Nash equilibria under some mild conditions for the hacker and victim. The sufficient conditions that when the ransom should be paid are presented when an organization is compromised by the ransomware attack. We further study how the costs and probabilities of cracking or recovering affect the expected payoffs of the hacker and the victim in the equilibria. In particular, it is found that the backup option for computer files is not always beneficial, which actually depends on the related cost. Moreover, it is discovered that fake ransomware may be more than expected because of the potential high payoffs. Numerical examples are also presented for illustration.
