论文标题
SYBIL弹性硬币铸造
Sybil-Resilient Coin Minting
论文作者
论文摘要
我们描述了一个分布式的硬币铸造协议，该协议为数字社区中的每个成员铸造一个每次硬币。该协议假设社区成员使用信任图来确定数字身份的真实性，并且这样做在社区中的Sybils（伪造或重复身份）的数量界定，但并不能完全消除它们。该协议的主要目标是对穿透社区的Sybils具有韧性，从长远来看，只有真正的身份薄荷硬币。该协议接受Sybils时不时渗透社区（通过在信任图中获得足够的信任），但假设每个Sybil最终都会暴露出来。由于Sybil铸造的硬币很可能会在暴露时流通，因此该协议负责将Sybil引入其信任的邻居，并没收其后来的硬币，直到该Sybil铸造的硬币被解释为。特别是，该协议没收了由Sybil铸造的每个硬币的两枚硬币：一个是为了恢复错误的铸造物，首先是引入Sybil的罚款。我们认为，这种方法构成了阻止Sybils引入社区并激励Sybil狩猎的一种机制（使用被没收的钱作为奖励）。
We describe a distributed coin minting protocol that mints one coin per time unit for each member in a digital community. The protocol assumes that community members use a trust-graph to determine the genuineness of digital identities, and that doing so bounds the number of sybils (fake or duplicate identities) in the community, but does not completely eliminate them. The main goal of the protocol is to be resilient to the sybils that penetrate the community, in the sense that, in the long run, only genuine identities mint coins. The protocol accepts that sybils penetrate the community from time to time (by gaining enough trust within the trust-graph), yet assumes that every sybil is eventually exposed. Since coins minted by a sybil will most probably circulate by the time it is exposed, the protocol puts the responsibility for introducing a sybil onto its trusting neighbours and confiscates subsequent coins minted by them, until the coins minted by that sybil are accounted for. In particular, the protocol confiscates two coins for each coin minted by the sybil: one to recover what was wrongly minted and one as a fine for introducing the sybil in the first place. We argue that this approach constitutes a mechanism to deter the introduction of sybils into the community and to incentivize sybil hunting (using part of the confiscated money as a reward).
