论文标题
签约持久信息
Contracting over persistent information
论文作者
论文摘要
我们考虑委托人与代理之间的动态道德危害问题，唯一的工具要激励代理人是信息的披露。本金旨在最大化代理商选择特定诉讼的（折扣）次数，例如努力工作。我们表明，存在最佳合同，一旦其最喜欢的诉讼是代理商的静态答复，校长就停止披露信息，或者继续披露信息，直到代理人完美地了解校长的私人信息为止。如果代理商完美地学习了国家，他将在有限的时间内以概率为生学习。代理商越耐心，他稍后就会学习。
We consider a dynamic moral hazard problem between a principal and an agent, where the sole instrument the principal has to incentivize the agent is the disclosure of information. The principal aims at maximizing the (discounted) number of times the agent chooses a particular action, e.g., to work hard. We show that there exists an optimal contract, where the principal stops disclosing information as soon as its most preferred action is a static best reply for the agent or else continues disclosing information until the agent perfectly learns the principal's private information. If the agent perfectly learns the state, he learns it in finite time with probability one; the more patient the agent, the later he learns it.
