论文标题
经济经济体中的游戏
Games in rigged economies
论文作者
论文摘要
现代经济体从更简单的人类交流演变为非常复杂的系统。如今,可以调节,篡改或让偶然地调节许多方面。这些是经济{\ em自由程度},共同塑造了财富的流动。经济参与者可以以一定的代价来利用他们,并弯腰对他们有利。如果干预变得广泛,不同参与者的微观经济策略可能会发生碰撞或共鸣,从而融入宏观经济影响。 “操纵”经济的可行性如何,这种生存能力如何受经济复杂性和财富的影响?在这里,我们通过玩具模型捕获了“操纵”经济体的基本要素。在简单案例中,纳什的收益矩阵平衡表明,增加干预措施如何将经济自由从少数群体转变为多数游戏,直到动态阶段。这些阶段是通过基于代理的模拟模拟复制的,这使我们能够探索场景不足以获得回报矩阵。然后,增加经济复杂性是一种自发削弱卡特尔或共识情况的机制。但是,过度复杂性突然进入了威胁系统可行性的大波动的政权。该政权是由于无竞争力的努力而造成的,该努力是为了干预跨自由度的经济,变得不可预测。因此,由于经济复杂性,非竞争性的行动可能导致负面溢出。模拟表明,财富必须比线性复杂的速度更快,以避免这种制度,并使经济长期以来可行。我们的工作提供了可测试的结论和现象学图表,以指导“操纵”经济体系的警务。
Modern economies evolved from simpler human exchanges into very convoluted systems. Today, a multitude of aspects can be regulated, tampered with, or left to chance; these are economic {\em degrees of freedom} which together shape the flow of wealth. Economic actors can exploit them, at a cost, and bend that flow in their favor. If intervention becomes widespread, microeconomic strategies of different actors can collide or resonate, building into macroeconomic effects. How viable is a `rigged' economy, and how is this viability affected by growing economic complexity and wealth? Here we capture essential elements of `rigged' economies with a toy model. Nash equilibria of payoff matrices in simple cases show how increased intervention turns economic degrees of freedom from minority into majority games through a dynamical phase. These stages are reproduced by agent-based simulations of our model, which allow us to explore scenarios out of reach for payoff matrices. Increasing economic complexity is then revealed as a mechanism that spontaneously defuses cartels or consensus situations. But excessive complexity enters abruptly into a regime of large fluctuations that threaten the system's viability. This regime results from non-competitive efforts to intervene the economy coupled across degrees of freedom, becoming unpredictable. Thus non-competitive actions can result in negative spillover due to sheer economic complexity. Simulations suggest that wealth must grow faster than linearly with economic complexity to avoid this regime and keep economies viable in the long run. Our work provides testable conclusions and phenomenological charts to guide policing of `rigged' economic systems.