论文标题
实验性量子密钥分布安全针对恶意设备
Experimental quantum key distribution secure against malicious devices
论文作者
论文摘要
量子密钥分布(QKD)系统的制造通常涉及几个方,从而为前夕提供了多种与设备进行干预的机会。结果,常规的硬件和/或软件黑客攻击对实用QKD的安全构成了自然威胁。幸运的是,如果损坏设备的数量有限,则可以使用冗余设备来恢复安全性。在这里,我们报告了一个安全的QKD设置,该设置具有光学设备和可能由窃听器控制的经典后处理单元。我们在\ emph {两者}上,基于1.25 GHz芯片的测量设备QKD系统安全地针对恶意设备进行了测量和用户方面。在24 dB的通道损失中,秘密关键率达到137个基点。我们的设置受益于高时钟速率,微型发射机和具有成本效益的结构,为需要毫不妥协的通信安全性提供了有希望的解决方案。
The fabrication of quantum key distribution (QKD) systems typically involves several parties, thus providing Eve with multiple opportunities to meddle with the devices. As a consequence, conventional hardware and/or software hacking attacks pose natural threats to the security of practical QKD. Fortunately, if the number of corrupted devices is limited, the security can be restored by using redundant apparatuses. Here, we report on the demonstration of a secure QKD setup with optical devices and classical post-processing units possibly controlled by an eavesdropper. We implement a 1.25 GHz chip-based measurement-device-independent QKD system secure against malicious devices on \emph{both} the measurement and the users' sides. The secret key rate reaches 137 bps over a 24 dB channel loss. Our setup, benefiting from high clock rate, miniaturized transmitters and a cost-effective structure, provides a promising solution for widespread applications requiring uncompromising communication security.