论文标题
信任和背叛：未能承诺的声誉收益和行为
Trust and Betrayals: Reputational Payoffs and Behaviors without Commitment
论文作者
论文摘要
我研究了一个重复的游戏，其中患者玩家（例如卖方）希望赢得一些近视对手（例如买家）的信任，但可以严格从背叛他们中受益。她从背叛中受益是严格的积极，是她持续的私人信息。我表征了每种类型的患者球员的最高均衡收益。她的持续私人信息仅通过最低的利益来影响对手的先前信念。我还表明，在适合患者玩家最佳的每个均衡中，她的课程行为是非组织的，并且她的长期动作频率都固定在两种类型之外。从概念上讲，我的回报型方法包含了一个现实的关注，即没有任何类型的声誉构建参与者不受重新诱惑的影响。与承诺类型的模型相比，所有类型的患者玩家的激励限制导致了她最高可达到的回报和对行为的新颖预测的敏锐表征。
I study a repeated game in which a patient player (e.g., a seller) wants to win the trust of some myopic opponents (e.g., buyers) but can strictly benefit from betraying them. Her benefit from betrayal is strictly positive and is her persistent private information. I characterize every type of patient player's highest equilibrium payoff. Her persistent private information affects this payoff only through the lowest benefit in the support of her opponents' prior belief. I also show that in every equilibrium which is optimal for the patient player, her on-path behavior is nonstationary, and her long-run action frequencies are pinned down for all except two types. Conceptually, my payoff-type approach incorporates a realistic concern that no type of reputation-building player is immune to reneging temptations. Compared to commitment-type models, the incentive constraints for all types of patient player lead to a sharp characterization of her highest attainable payoff and novel predictions on her behaviors.
