论文标题
否决权委托
Delegation in Veto Bargaining
论文作者
论文摘要
提议者需要否决参与者的批准才能更改现状。偏好是单个峰值。提议者不确定否决者的理想点。我们研究建议者的最佳机制，没有转移。为否决者提供了一个菜单或委托集，可供选择。最佳代表团集可以平衡提议者的妥协程度和否决权的风险。在合理的条件下，“全授权”是最佳的：否决者可以选择现状和提议者的理想行动之间的任何动作。这种结果在很大程度上取消了提议者的议价能力； Vetoer经常获得她的理想点，尽管信息不对称，但仍有帕累托效率。更普遍地，我们确定何时“间隔委托”是最佳的。最佳间隔代表团对于廉价谈话可能是帕累托的改进。我们得出比较静态。与基于专业知识的委托相比，当偏好更有可能保持一致时，否决者会获得较少的酌处权。从方法上讲，我们的分析处理随机机制。
A proposer requires the approval of a veto player to change a status quo. Preferences are single peaked. Proposer is uncertain about Vetoer's ideal point. We study Proposer's optimal mechanism without transfers. Vetoer is given a menu, or a delegation set, to choose from. The optimal delegation set balances the extent of Proposer's compromise with the risk of a veto. Under reasonable conditions, "full delegation" is optimal: Vetoer can choose any action between the status quo and Proposer's ideal action. This outcome largely nullifies Proposer's bargaining power; Vetoer frequently obtains her ideal point, and there is Pareto efficiency despite asymmetric information. More generally, we identify when "interval delegation" is optimal. Optimal interval delegation can be a Pareto improvement over cheap talk. We derive comparative statics. Vetoer receives less discretion when preferences are more likely to be aligned, by contrast to expertise-based delegation. Methodologically, our analysis handles stochastic mechanisms.
