论文标题
将BGP屈服于路线泄漏:Peerlock主动测量和分析
Flexsealing BGP Against Route Leaks: Peerlock Active Measurement and Analysis
论文作者
论文摘要
BGP路线泄漏经常导致严重破坏域间路由。这些事件困扰着互联网数十年,而部署和可用性问题削弱了缓解问题的努力。 Peerlock于2016年推出,以一种新的方法解决了路线泄漏。 Peerlock使公交提供商之间的过滤协议能够保护自己的网络,而无需进行广泛合作或信任基础架构。我们概述了Peerlock系统和一个变体Peerlock-Lite,并进行了实时的Internet实验,以测量其在控制平面上的部署。我们的测量结果找到了在对等集团中1级网络之间进行大量Peerlock保护的证据,在该集团中,部署了48%的潜在Peerlock过滤器,并揭示了许多其他网络还针对第1层泄漏部署了过滤器。为了指导进一步的部署,我们还通过BGP模拟量化了Peerlock对当前观察到的水平和假设的未来部署方案的影响。这些实验表明,目前的Peerlock部署限制了第1层泄漏导出至10%或更少的网络,对于40%的模拟泄漏。在所有大型ISP(所有网络的少于1%)的战略性附加Peerlock-Lite部署,随着部署的部署,与对等集团内的Peerlock同时,完全减轻了模拟的1路线泄漏的80%。
BGP route leaks frequently precipitate serious disruptions to interdomain routing. These incidents have plagued the Internet for decades while deployment and usability issues cripple efforts to mitigate the problem. Peerlock, introduced in 2016, addresses route leaks with a new approach. Peerlock enables filtering agreements between transit providers to protect their own networks without the need for broad cooperation or a trust infrastructure. We outline the Peerlock system and one variant, Peerlock-lite, and conduct live Internet experiments to measure their deployment on the control plane. Our measurements find evidence for significant Peerlock protection between Tier 1 networks in the peering clique, where 48% of potential Peerlock filters are deployed, and reveal that many other networks also deploy filters against Tier 1 leaks. To guide further deployment, we also quantify Peerlock's impact on route leaks both at currently observed levels and under hypothetical future deployment scenarios via BGP simulation. These experiments reveal present Peerlock deployment restricts Tier 1 leak export to 10% or fewer networks for 40% of simulated leaks. Strategic additional Peerlock-lite deployment at all large ISPs (fewer than 1% of all networks), in tandem with Peerlock within the peering clique as deployed, completely mitigates 80% of simulated Tier 1 route leaks.