论文标题
救助污名
Bailout Stigma
论文作者
论文摘要
我们开发了一种救助污名模型，接受救助的信号标志着公司的资产负债表弱点，并使其资金前景恶化。为了避免污名，高质量的公司要么在获得救助后退出随后的融资，要么完全拒绝救助以发送有利的信号。前者导致短暂的刺激，随后的市场冻结甚至比没有救助的情况更糟。后者将资金市场恢复了，尽管延迟，但在没有任何污名的情况下可以达到水平，并实现了有限的最佳结果。多个救助计划的菜单还使救助污名化并使市场冻结恶化。
We develop a model of bailout stigma where accepting a bailout signals a firm's balance-sheet weakness and worsens its funding prospect. To avoid stigma, high-quality firms either withdraw from subsequent financing after receiving bailouts or refuse bailouts altogether to send a favorable signal. The former leads to a short-lived stimulation with a subsequent market freeze even worse than if there were no bailouts. The latter revives the funding market, albeit with delay, to the level achievable without any stigma, and implements a constrained optimal outcome. A menu of multiple bailout programs also compounds bailout stigma and worsens market freeze.
