论文标题
图层安全性：通过通用网络物理学加密信息
Graph Layer Security: Encrypting Information via Common Networked Physics
论文作者
论文摘要
低成本互联网（IoT）设备的扩散导致了无线安全和频道攻击之间的比赛。传统的密码学需要高度计算的力量，并且不适合低功耗的物联网情景。 WHIST，最近开发的物理层安全性（PLS）可以利用通用无线通道状态信息（CSI），其对信道估计的敏感性使它们因攻击而容易受到攻击。在这项工作中，我们利用了物联网收发器之间共享的另一种共同的物理：受监视的通道 - 欧元物理网络动力学（例如，水/油/气/天然气/电信号流）。通过利用网络节点之间物理动力学的依赖性以获取信息加密和解密，我们首次提出了图形层安全性（GLS）。图形傅立叶变换（GFT）运算符用于将这种依赖性表征为图形凸起的子空间，该子空间可以通过最大化保密率来允许通道 - iRrelevant密码键的几代。我们使用IEEE 39-BUS系统对设计的主动和被动攻击者评估了GLS。结果表明，GLS不依赖无线CSI，并且可以打击具有部分网络动态知识的攻击者（现实地访问完全动态和关键节点仍然具有挑战性）。我们认为，这种新颖的GLS在对抗无线电环境中的安全健康监测和数字双胞胎中广泛适用。
The proliferation of low-cost Internet of Things (IoT) devices has led to a race between wireless security and channel attacks. Traditional cryptography requires high-computational power and is not suitable for low-power IoT scenarios. Whist, recently developed physical layer security (PLS) can exploit common wireless channel state information (CSI), its sensitivity to channel estimation makes them vulnerable from attacks. In this work, we exploit an alternative common physics shared between IoT transceivers: the monitored channel-irrelevant physical networked dynamics (e.g., water/oil/gas/electrical signal-flows). Leveraging this, we propose for the first time, graph layer security (GLS), by exploiting the dependency in physical dynamics among network nodes for information encryption and decryption. A graph Fourier transform (GFT) operator is used to characterize such dependency into a graph-bandlimted subspace, which allows the generations of channel-irrelevant cipher keys by maximizing the secrecy rate. We evaluate our GLS against designed active and passive attackers, using IEEE 39-Bus system. Results demonstrate that, GLS is not reliant on wireless CSI, and can combat attackers that have partial networked dynamic knowledge (realistic access to full dynamic and critical nodes remains challenging). We believe this novel GLS has widespread applicability in secure health monitoring and for Digital Twins in adversarial radio environments.
