论文标题
市场上的沟通与合作
Communication and Cooperation in Markets
论文作者
论文摘要
许多市场依靠交易者如实交流，他们过去曾作弊并从未来的交易中排斥这些交易者。本文调查了何时兼容真实的沟通。我们发现，如果双方都有近视激励措施偏离，那么只有在交易量较低时，就可以满足沟通激励措施。相比之下，如果只有一侧有近视动力偏离，那么沟通激励措施不会限制可支持的贸易的数量。因此，从结构贸易中获得了很大的收益，因此一方要么先移动，要么由外部执行保证其合作。
Many markets rely on traders truthfully communicating who has cheated in the past and ostracizing those traders from future trade. This paper investigates when truthful communication is incentive compatible. We find that if each side has a myopic incentive to deviate, then communication incentives are satisfied only when the volume of trade is low. By contrast, if only one side has a myopic incentive to deviate, then communication incentives do not constrain the volume of supportable trade. Accordingly, there are strong gains from structuring trade so that one side either moves first or has its cooperation guaranteed by external enforcement.
