论文标题
最后的防御线背后 - 幸存的SOC缺陷和入侵
Behind the Last Line of Defense -- Surviving SoC Faults and Intrusions
论文作者
论文摘要
如今,利用芯片上许多核心系统(SOCS)的巨大模块化功能,多样性和灵活性需要仔细编排复杂的资源,该任务留给了低级软件,例如管理程序。在当前的体系结构中,该软件形成了单个故障点,值得攻击的目标:一旦受到妥协,对手就可以访问所有信息并完全控制平台及其控制的环境。本文提出了MIDIR,这是一种增强的许多核心架构,从而实现了从SOCS到分布式SOC的范式转变。 MIDIR通过通过众所周知的机制改造基于图块的故障遏制来改变平台资源的控制方式,同时确保对所有关键操作,尤其是特权管理,从而确保基于Quorum Quorum Quorum的共识,从而对遏制域进行管理。允许多功能冗余管理,MIDIR促进了所有软件级别(包括低级别)的弹性。我们解释了这种体系结构,其相关的算法和硬件机制,并在拜占庭式容错的微流体视野中表明,它的表现优于高效的MinBft,以一个数量级。
Today, leveraging the enormous modular power, diversity and flexibility of manycore systems-on-a-chip (SoCs) requires careful orchestration of complex resources, a task left to low-level software, e.g. hypervisors. In current architectures, this software forms a single point of failure and worthwhile target for attacks: once compromised, adversaries gain access to all information and full control over the platform and the environment it controls. This paper proposes Midir, an enhanced manycore architecture, effecting a paradigm shift from SoCs to distributed SoCs. Midir changes the way platform resources are controlled, by retrofitting tile-based fault containment through well known mechanisms, while securing low-overhead quorum-based consensus on all critical operations, in particular privilege management and, thus, management of containment domains. Allowing versatile redundancy management, Midir promotes resilience for all software levels, including at low level. We explain this architecture, its associated algorithms and hardware mechanisms and show, for the example of a Byzantine fault tolerant microhypervisor, that it outperforms the highly efficient MinBFT by one order of magnitude.