论文标题
利用公共区块链进行分布式匿名服务的抗Sybil的自举
Utilizing Public Blockchains for the Sybil-Resistant Bootstrapping of Distributed Anonymity Services
论文作者
论文摘要
分发匿名服务，例如洋葱路由网络或加密货币不倒翁，承诺没有信任的第三方的隐私保护。尽管这些服务的安全性通常经过精心研究，但通常会忽略其所需的引导过程的安全含义：用户可以共同执行匿名化，或者他们需要依靠一组非碰撞的隐私同行。但是，通常少数的隐私同行使单个对手能够模仿分布式服务。因此，我们提出了一种耐Sybil的媒介Anonboot，可以通过公共区块链安全地启动匿名服务。 Anonboot执行会定期创建一个小的工作证明，以刷新其提供安全的匿名服务的资格。使用链熵的伪随机，本地可复制的引导过程，然后防止偏见合格的同伴的选举。我们使用比特币作为Anonboot的基础区块链的评估表明，它可以保持1000个同行的可信赖存储库，其中只有一个较小的存储空间，同时支持大多数区块链顶部的任意大型用户基础。
Distributed anonymity services, such as onion routing networks or cryptocurrency tumblers, promise privacy protection without trusted third parties. While the security of these services is often well-researched, security implications of their required bootstrapping processes are usually neglected: Users either jointly conduct the anonymization themselves, or they need to rely on a set of non-colluding privacy peers. However, the typically small number of privacy peers enable single adversaries to mimic distributed services. We thus present AnonBoot, a Sybil-resistant medium to securely bootstrap distributed anonymity services via public blockchains. AnonBoot enforces that peers periodically create a small proof of work to refresh their eligibility for providing secure anonymity services. A pseudo-random, locally replicable bootstrapping process using on-chain entropy then prevents biasing the election of eligible peers. Our evaluation using Bitcoin as AnonBoot's underlying blockchain shows its feasibility to maintain a trustworthy repository of 1000 peers with only a small storage footprint while supporting arbitrarily large user bases on top of most blockchains.
