论文标题
转售信息
Reselling Information
论文作者
论文摘要
信息是可复制的，因为它可以同时消耗并出售给他人。我们研究转售如何影响分散的信息以获取信息。我们表明，即使最初的卖方是一位信息垄断者，她也会捕获最多的单个买家租金：一旦单一买家购买了信息，她的收益将立即收集到0。相比之下，如果卖方也可以出售毫无价值的代币，则存在``预付款'''，在发布信息良好之前，请从所有买家那里提取付款。通过利用转售的可能性，这种预付款平衡使卖方像禁止转售一样高的回报。
Information is replicable in that it can be simultaneously consumed and sold to others. We study how resale affects a decentralized market for information. We show that even if the initial seller is an informational monopolist, she captures non-trivial rents from at most a single buyer: her payoffs converge to 0 as soon as a single buyer has bought information. By contrast, if the seller can also sell valueless tokens, there exists a ``prepay equilibrium'' where payment is extracted from all buyers before the information good is released. By exploiting resale possibilities, this prepay equilibrium gives the seller as high a payoff as she would achieve if resale were prohibited.
