论文标题
通过加密承诺可靠，真实和两轮（最佳）拍卖
Credible, Truthful, and Two-Round (Optimal) Auctions via Cryptographic Commitments
论文作者
论文摘要
我们考虑通过最大化卖方将单个商品出售给多个买家。 Akbarpour和Li的最新工作正式将\ Emph {信誉}正式为拍卖，并证明唯一的最佳，可信，策略性的拍卖是储备金的上升价格拍卖（Akbarpour和Li，Li，2019年）。 相比之下，当买方的估值为MHR时，我们表明，对密码安全的承诺方案的轻度额外假设足以进行简单的\ emph {两轮}拍卖，这是最佳，策略性且可靠的（即使只有拍卖行才知道投标人的数量）。 当买方估值为任何$α> 0 $的$α$ strongrongly juartible $ \ varepsilon $中的可信度时，我们将分析扩展到了案例。有趣的是，我们还证明，这种施工不能扩展到常规分布，也不能使用多个投标人删除$ \ varepsilon $。
We consider the sale of a single item to multiple buyers by a revenue-maximizing seller. Recent work of Akbarpour and Li formalizes \emph{credibility} as an auction desideratum, and prove that the only optimal, credible, strategyproof auction is the ascending price auction with reserves (Akbarpour and Li, 2019). In contrast, when buyers' valuations are MHR, we show that the mild additional assumption of a cryptographically secure commitment scheme suffices for a simple \emph{two-round} auction which is optimal, strategyproof, and credible (even when the number of bidders is only known by the auctioneer). We extend our analysis to the case when buyer valuations are $α$-strongly regular for any $α> 0$, up to arbitrary $\varepsilon$ in credibility. Interestingly, we also prove that this construction cannot be extended to regular distributions, nor can the $\varepsilon$ be removed with multiple bidders.
