学术文献库

Economic and operational advantages have led the supply chain of printed circuit boards (PCBs) to incorporate various untrusted entities. Any of the untrusted entities are capable of introducing malicious alterations to facilitate a functional failure or leakage of secret information during field operation. While researchers have been investigating the threat of malicious modification within the scale of individual microelectronic components, the possibility of a board-level malicious manipulation has essentially been unexplored. In the absence of standard benchmarking solutions, prospective countermeasures for PCB trust assurance are likely to utilize homegrown representation of the attacks that undermines their evaluation and does not provide scope for comparison with other techniques. In this paper, we have developed the first-ever benchmarking solution to facilitate an unbiased and comparable evaluation of countermeasures applicable to PCB trust assurance. Based on a taxonomy tailored for PCB-level alterations, we have developed high-level Trojan models. From these models, we have generated a custom pool of board-level Trojan designs of varied complexity and functionality. We have also developed a tool-flow for automatically inserting these Trojans into various PCB designs and generate the Trojan benchmarks (i.e., PCB designs with Trojan). The tool-based Trojan insertion facilitate a comprehensive evaluation against large number of diverse Trojan implementations and application of data mining for trust verification. Finally, with experimental measurements from a fabricated PCB, we analyze the stealthiness of the Trojan designs.