论文标题
通过秘密反应对控制系统的渐近安全性：不公开信念的重复信号游戏
Asymptotic Security of Control Systems by Covert Reaction: Repeated Signaling Game with Undisclosed Belief
论文作者
论文摘要
这项研究调查了控制系统与攻击的弹性与恶意攻击者可用的信息之间的关系。具体而言，可以证明，通过对潜在有害行动的秘密反应，保证控制系统可以以渐近的方式安全。通过重复的信号游戏，对攻击者和防御者的行为进行了分析，并在秘密反应下具有未公开的信念。在信号游戏的典型环境中，防御者进行的反应应该是公共信息，可衡量性使攻击者能够准确地追踪辩护人对存在恶意攻击者的信念的过渡。相比之下，本文考虑的游戏的信念尚未公开，因此不再使用常见的平衡概念进行分析。为了克服这一困难，引入了一个新颖的框架，以决定游戏中玩家合理策略的决策。基于提出的框架，据揭示，只要辩护人对攻击者无法观察到的任何合理恶意攻击者选择的合理策略都会收敛到良性行为。结果提供了弹性和信息之间的明确关系，这表明反应的秘密性对于设计安全控制系统的重要性。
This study investigates the relationship between resilience of control systems to attacks and the information available to malicious attackers. Specifically, it is shown that control systems are guaranteed to be secure in an asymptotic manner by rendering reactions against potentially harmful actions covert. The behaviors of the attacker and the defender are analyzed through a repeated signaling game with an undisclosed belief under covert reactions. In the typical setting of signaling games, reactions conducted by the defender are supposed to be public information and the measurability enables the attacker to accurately trace transitions of the defender's belief on existence of a malicious attacker. In contrast, the belief in the game considered in this paper is undisclosed and hence common equilibrium concepts can no longer be employed for the analysis. To surmount this difficulty, a novel framework for decision of reasonable strategies of the players in the game is introduced. Based on the presented framework, it is revealed that any reasonable strategy chosen by a rational malicious attacker converges to the benign behavior as long as the reactions performed by the defender are unobservable to the attacker. The result provides an explicit relationship between resilience and information, which indicates the importance of covertness of reactions for designing secure control systems.
