论文标题
$ n-1 $可靠性使虚假数据注射攻击很难引起身体后果
$N-1$ Reliability Makes It Difficult for False Data Injection Attacks to Cause Physical Consequences
论文作者
论文摘要
本文表明，错误的数据注入（FDI）攻击对通过实时应急分析（RTCA）和安全性约束经济调度（SCED）造成物理后果的能力极为有限。先前的工作表明，外国直接投资攻击可以通过攻击者犯罪者双级线性程序（ADBLP）设计，以在使用DCOPF重新划分后引起物理溢出。在本文中，显示出使用DCOPF设计的攻击无法在$ N-1 $可靠的系统上引起溢出，因为建模的系统响应是不准确的。提出了一种准确对系统响应进行建模的ADBLP，以找到最坏的物理后果，从而对强大的攻击者进行系统级知识进行建模。在合成的德克萨斯系统中使用2000辆公交车的仿真结果表明，即使有了新的增强攻击，由于$ n-1 $的约束，该系统也可以保守地运行，设计的攻击只会导致续签后的溢出。此外，攻击者必须控制大部分测量结果，并在系统中实际创建偶然性以引起后果。因此，这是可以想象的，但要求一个极其复杂的攻击者对使用RTCA和SCED操作的$ N-1 $可靠的电源系统造成物理后果。
This paper demonstrates that false data injection (FDI) attacks are extremely limited in their ability to cause physical consequences on $N-1$ reliable power systems operating with real-time contingency analysis (RTCA) and security constrained economic dispatch (SCED). Prior work has shown that FDI attacks can be designed via an attacker-defender bi-level linear program (ADBLP) to cause physical overflows after re-dispatch using DCOPF. In this paper, it is shown that attacks designed using DCOPF fail to cause overflows on $N-1$ reliable systems because the system response modeled is inaccurate. An ADBLP that accurately models the system response is proposed to find the worst-case physical consequences, thereby modeling a strong attacker with system level knowledge. Simulation results on the synthetic Texas system with 2000 buses show that even with the new enhanced attacks, for systems operated conservatively due to $N-1$ constraints, the designed attacks only lead to post-contingency overflows. Moreover, the attacker must control a large portion of measurements and physically create a contingency in the system to cause consequences. Therefore, it is conceivable but requires an extremely sophisticated attacker to cause physical consequences on $N-1$ reliable power systems operated with RTCA and SCED.
