论文标题
躺在网络上：结构和拓扑在促进诚实中的作用
Lying on networks: The role of structure and topology in promoting honesty
论文作者
论文摘要
谎言可能会对政府，公司和整个社会产生负面影响。因此，了解说谎的动力学在不同的研究领域至关重要。虽然撒谎之前已经在混杂的人群中进行了研究，但实际上很少有混杂的事实。实际上，它们通常是结构化的，因此最好由网络描述。因此，在这里，我们使用蒙特卡洛方法研究在一个参数网络中躺在发送者接收器游戏中的演变，系统地涵盖完整的网络，小世界网络和一维环。我们表明，在接收方的成本（所谓的黑色谎言）上，在网络上的谎言比在良好混杂的人群中所做的谎言不太可能激增。因此，诚实更有可能发展，但只有当发送者的收益小于接收器的成本时。此外，在小世界网络中，这种效果尤其强大，但在一维环中效果却少。对于以接收者为代价的谎言，即发件人，即所谓的无私的白色谎言，我们表明诚实也比混合良好的人群更有可能发展。但是与黑色的谎言相反，这种效果在一维环中更加表达，而在小世界网络中，只有当发件人的成本大于接收器的收益时，才出现。最后，对于有利于发件人和接收者的谎言，所谓的帕累托白色谎言，我们表明网络结构实际上有利于说谎的演变，但是只有当发件人的福利略大于接收者的利益时，这才是有利于撒谎的。在这种情况下，小世界拓扑再次起到了效果的放大器，而其他网络拓扑则无法做到这一点。
Lies can have a negating impact on governments, companies, and the society as a whole. Understanding the dynamics of lying is therefore of crucial importance across different fields of research. While lying has been studied before in well-mixed populations, it is a fact that real interactions are rarely well-mixed. Indeed, they are usually structured and thus best described by networks. Here we therefore use the Monte Carlo method to study the evolution of lying in the sender-receiver game in a one-parameter family of networks, systematically covering complete networks, small-world networks, and one-dimensional rings. We show that lies which benefit the sender at a cost to the receiver, the so-called black lies, are less likely to proliferate on networks than they do in well-mixed populations. Honesty is thus more likely to evolve, but only when the benefit for the sender is smaller than the cost for the receiver. Moreover, this effect is particularly strong in small-world networks, but less so in the one-dimensional ring. For lies that favor the receiver at a cost to the sender, the so-called altruistic white lies, we show that honesty is also more likely to evolve than it is in well-mixed populations. But contrary to black lies, this effect is more expressed in the one-dimensional ring, whereas in small-world networks it is present only when the cost to the sender is greater than the benefit for the receiver. Lastly, for lies that benefit both the sender and the receiver, the so-called Pareto white lies, we show that the network structure actually favors the evolution of lying, but this only when the benefit for the sender is slightly greater than the benefit for the receiver. In this case again the small-world topology acts as an amplifier of the effect, while other network topologies fail to do the same.
